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K E V I N  T O B I A  
Disparate Statistics 
abstract.  Statistical evidence is crucial throughout disparate impact’s three-stage analysis: 
during (1) the plaintiff ’s prima facie demonstration of a policy’s disparate impact; (2) the de-
fendant’s job-related business necessity defense of the discriminatory policy; and (3) the plain-
tiff ’s demonstration of an alternative policy without the same discriminatory impact. The circuit 
courts are split on a vital question about the “practical signiﬁcance” of statistics at Stage 1: Are 
“small” impacts legally insigniﬁcant? For example, is an employment policy that causes a one 
percent disparate impact an appropriate policy for redress through disparate impact litigation? 
This circuit split calls for a comprehensive analysis of practical signiﬁcance testing across dispar-
ate impact’s stages. Importantly, courts and commentators use “practical signiﬁcance” ambigu-
ously between two aspects of practical signiﬁcance: the magnitude of an effect and conﬁdence in 
statistical evidence. For example, at Stage 1 courts might ask whether statistical evidence sup-
ports a disparate impact (a conﬁdence inquiry) and whether such an impact is large enough to be 
legally relevant (a magnitude inquiry). Disparate impact’s texts, purposes, and controlling inter-
pretations are consistent with conﬁdence inquires at all three stages, but not magnitude inquir-
ies. Speciﬁcally, magnitude inquiries are inappropriate at Stages 1 and 3—there is no discrimina-
tory impact or reduction too small or subtle for the purposes of the disparate impact analysis. 
Magnitude inquiries are appropriate at Stage 2, when an employer defends a discriminatory poli-
cy on the basis of its job-related business necessity.  
 
author . Yale Law School, J.D. expected; Yale Philosophy, Ph.D. expected; Rutgers  
University, B.A. 2012. I thank the Yale Law Journal staff, especially Notes Editors Greg Cui, Joe 
Falvey, and Urja Mittal. This argument’s examples involve impacts on communities of which I 
am not a member. Such advocacy is “a touchy sort of subject,” in the words of SJA Germanotta: 
“Can you stand up for people [when] you are not necessarily fully part of that community in a 
way that [members] can understand?” Most special thanks to Owen Fiss and the 2016 Commu-
nity of Equals seminar participants who taught me a tremendous amount, including how to ap-
proach this question. 
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introduction 
Statistical evidence is crucial in each stage of disparate impact’s three-stage 
analysis: (1) the plaintiff ’s prima facie demonstration of a policy’s disparate 
impact; (2) the defendant’s job-related business necessity defense of the dis-
criminatory policy; and (3) the plaintiff ’s demonstration of an alternative poli-
cy without the same discriminatory impact. There is a circuit split on the role 
of “practical signiﬁcance” inquiries at the prima facie stage,
1
 raising a funda-
mental question about disparate impact theory: Are such “small”—effects, 
about whose existence we are conﬁdent—legally insigniﬁcant? For example, is 
an employment policy that causes a one percent disparate impact an appropri-
ate object of disparate impact litigation? 
This question calls for a broader analysis of “practical signiﬁcance” at each 
of disparate impact’s three stages. Importantly, courts use “practical signiﬁ-
cance” in multiple ways. The present argument’s primary focus is practical sig-
niﬁcance referring to the magnitude of an effect supported by statistical evi-
dence. I call courts’ evaluation of the size of an effect a “magnitude inquiry.” 
Another sense of practical signiﬁcance involves the strength of the inference 
from an empirical-statistical ﬁnding to the real world. I refer to a court’s evalu-
ation of this aspect of practical signiﬁcance as a “conﬁdence inquiry.” This is an 
important distinction, and courts and commentators often use “practical sig-
niﬁcance” in ways that are ambiguous between these two aspects.
2
 The second 
aspect—practical signiﬁcance as the strength of the inference supported by sta-
tistical evidence—is obviously relevant to disparate impact analysis, in the same 
way that assessing the strength of the inference supported by evidence is al-
 
1. E.g., compare Jones v. City of Bos., 752 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding a prima facie dis-
parate impact where there was a 1% difference in selection rates), with Frazier v. Garrison 
I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1524 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 4.5% difference in selection rates 
was trivial); see also sources cited infra note 6. Compare Michael Stenger, The First Circuit 
Strikes Out in Jones v. City of Boston: A Pitch for Practical Signiﬁcance in Disparate Impact 
Cases, 60 VILL. L. REV. 411 (2015) (arguing for practical signiﬁcance testing at the prima face 
stage), and Katie Eissenstat, Note, Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: The Case To Require 
“Practical Signiﬁcance” To Establish a Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 68 
OKLA. L. REV. 641 (2016) (same), with Elliott Ko, Note, Big Enough To Matter: Whether Sta-
tistical Signiﬁcance or Practical Signiﬁcance Should Be the Test for Title VII Disparate Impact 
Claims, 101 MINN. L. REV. 869, 881-87 (2016) (arguing for no practical signiﬁcance testing 
at the prima facie stage). 
2. For example, Eissenstat, Stenger, and Ko focus on “practical signiﬁcance” rather than distin-
guishing between magnitude and conﬁdence inquiries. See sources cited supra note 1. While 
this argument agrees with Ko’s conclusion regarding magnitude inquires at the prima facie 
stage—such inquiries are inappropriate—the analysis here employs different reasoning. 
These commentators also focus on only the ﬁrst stage of disparate impact analysis. 
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ways relevant. A debate remains regarding “magnitude inquires,” evaluations of 
whether some effect is sufficiently large, at each stage of analysis. 
I argue that such magnitude inquiries are inappropriately used to evaluate 
whether a “large enough” prima facie disparate impact exists or whether an al-
ternative policy with less discriminatory impact promises a “large enough” de-
crease in discriminatory impact, at the ﬁrst and third stages of disparate impact 
litigation. However, magnitude inquiries are more appropriate when an em-
ployer defends a discriminatory policy on the basis of its job-related business 
necessity, at the second stage of disparate impact litigation. Thus, this argu-
ment’s primary contribution is an analysis of “magnitude inquiries,” one aspect 
of practical signiﬁcance, across all three stages of disparate impact. 
The Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes disparate impact theory, 
highlighting the logic of the shifting burden of proof,
3
 and relevant statistical 
concepts. Part II analyzes statistics’ role at three stages of disparate impact 
analysis: the plaintiff ’s establishment of prima facie disparate impact, the de-
fendant’s rebuttal of establishing a test’s job-relatedness and business necessity, 
and the plaintiff ’s proposal of a less discriminatory alternative policy. I argue 
that disparate impact law supports the rejection of magnitude inquiries for a 
plaintiff ’s prima facie case of disparate impact and proposal of a less discrimi-
natory alternative, but it supports a more robust magnitude inquiry during an 
employer’s establishment of a disparity-causing test’s job-relatedness and busi-
ness necessity. Part III provides recommendations for improving the use of sta-
tistics in disparate impact analysis.
 
This Note contributes a defense of the First Circuit’s decision, which has 
previously been subjected to critical commentary.
4
 Importantly, it highlights 
the distinction between two aspects of “practical signiﬁcance” sometimes ob-
scured in disparate impact discussions: magnitude and conﬁdence. The Note 
also contributes a comprehensive analysis of practical signiﬁcance, providing 
recommendations for the use of statistics at all three stages of disparate impact 
litigation. In doing so, it calls for courts to reﬂect broadly about whether their 
use of statistics at each stage is consistent with their uses at the two other stag-
es, their underlying theory of statistics and evidence, and their disparate impact 
theory. 
 
3. The burden shifts from the plaintiff ’s prima facie case of disparate impact to the defendant’s 
rebuttal (demonstrating job-relatedness and business necessity), then back to the plaintiff ’s 
demonstration of an alternative measure that causes a lesser disparity. 
4. See, e.g., Eissenstat, supra note 1; Stenger, supra note 1. But see Ko, supra note 1. 
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Given the amount
5
 and importance
6
 of disparate impact litigation, address-
ing key questions that can determine the outcome of these actions, such as 
courts’ use of magnitude inquiries, can be of great consequence. Indeed, these 
issues have provoked controversy. Today, the role of “practical signiﬁcance” in 
the prima facie stage of disparate impact analysis is at the heart of a circuit split. 
The First, Third, and Tenth Circuits oppose practical signiﬁcance inquiries; the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits endorse them; and 
the D.C., Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have no clear precedent.
7
 
 
5. There have been hundreds of disparate impact cases. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate 
Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006). 
6. See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the Future 
of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 225-26 (1990). 
7. See Ko, supra note 1, at 881-87 (cataloging the circuit split in these terms). In support of the 
circuit split claim, Ko helpfully cites to (1) various cases opposing practical signiﬁcance test-
ing from the First Circuit: Jones v. City of Bos., 752 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2014); Third Circuit: 
Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 372 (3d Cir. 2011); Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2010); Tenth Circuit: Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 
1184, 1199 (10th Cir. 2012) (an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case); (2) 
various cases endorsing practical signiﬁcance testing from the Second Circuit: Burgis v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2015); Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 
685 F.3d 135, 153 (2d Cir. 2012); Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 
(2d Cir. 1991); Fourth Circuit: Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 908 (4th Cir. 2015); 
Fifth Circuit: Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 545 (5th Cir. 1980); Ensley 
Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 818 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980); Moore v. Sw. Bell Tel. 
Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979); Sixth Circuit: Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 
404 (6th Cir. 2005); Ninth Circuit: Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 515-16, 516 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1985); and 
Eleventh Circuit: Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994); and 
(3) various cases indicating no clear precedent on practical signiﬁcance testing from the D.C. 
Circuit: Delgado v. Ashcroft, No. Civ. A. 99-2311(JR), 2003 WL 24051558, at *8 (D.D.C. 
May 29, 2003); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F. Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C. 1992); Reynolds 
v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 966–67 (D.D.C. 1980), aff ’d, 702 F.2d 
221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Seventh Circuit: Bew v. City of Chicago, 252 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 
2001); Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 426–27 (7th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–88 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff ’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th 
Cir. 1988); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 536–40 (7th Cir. 1985); and Eighth 
Circuit: Hameed v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Un-
ion No. 396, 637 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 1980). 
    There is some room for debate about whether all of these courts endorse, oppose, or 
remain neutral (respectively) on the question of prima facie practical signiﬁcance. For in-
stance, some of the Circuits that are counted as endorsing practical signiﬁcance might in-
stead be read as considering “practical signiﬁcance” in the sense of whether the statistical ev-
idence is good evidence of a disparity, not in the sense of whether the real-world disparity is 
of a certain magnitude. In Waisome and Nucor, the Second and Fourth Circuits, respectively, 
endorse case-by-case approaches in which statistical signiﬁcance should often be interpreted 
with consideration of surrounding circumstances; this is far from a clear endorsement of 
 
disparate statistics 
2387 
Before turning to the analysis, it is worth noting that these legal questions 
arise against a particular scientiﬁc and cultural backdrop: the danger of relying 
on mere statistical signiﬁcance in interpreting empirical studies is the subject of 
scientiﬁc and increasingly popular concern, and looking to “practical signiﬁ-
cance” is a popular remedy.
8
 Calls to move science beyond simple statistical 
signiﬁcance testing are not exclusive to the current moment,
9
 nor are calls to 
move toward some form of practical signiﬁcance testing.
10
 Unreﬂective reliance 
on scientiﬁc trends might suggest that practical signiﬁcance inquiries of all 
forms—including magnitude inquiries—are necessary parts of sound method-
ology, including throughout disparate impact analysis.  
 This Note cautions otherwise.
11
 
 
practical signiﬁcance testing in the sense of requiring a particular magnitude of a prima facie 
disparate impact. There is certainly good evidence for the existence of some circuit split on 
the question of statistical signiﬁcance in the sense of a disparity’s magnitude—compare, for 
example, the First and Fifth Circuits: Jones against Moore. But the magnitude of the circuit 
split on this question may not be as large as is sometimes suggested. 
   Of course, the more cautious interpretation of the circuit split’s breadth does not imply 
the unimportance of analyzing practical signiﬁcance usage; in fact, it implies the opposite. 
The breadth of the split is difficult to assess precisely because courts use “practical signiﬁ-
cance” in ambiguous and divergent ways. To assess statistical evidence’s “practical signiﬁ-
cance”—in the sense of weighing how the evidence bears on the inference of a real-world 
disparate impact—is clearly a useful and legitimate inquiry. To assess statistical evidence’s 
“practical signiﬁcance”—in the sense of weighing whether the real-world disparity is large 
enough—is more controversial. 
8. See, e.g., Eric Loken & Andrew Gelman, Measurement Error and the Replication Crisis, 355 SCI. 
584 (2017); Regina Nuzzo, Statistical Errors, 506 NATURE 150 (2014); Amy Gallo, A Refresher 
on Statistical Signiﬁcance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://hbr.org/2016/02/a 
-refresher-on-statistical-signiﬁcance [http://perma.cc/Q96D-3PC3]; see also Christie 
Aschwanden, Science Isn’t Broken: It’s Just a Hell of a Lot Harder than We Give It Credit for, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 19, 2015), http://ﬁvethirtyeight.com/features/science-isnt-broken 
[http://perma.cc/R6W6-ZUNA](providing a popular science commentary on statistical 
signiﬁcance and “p-hacking”, the process of inﬂuencing or manipulating statistical signiﬁ-
cance testing results by making choices about data such as which groups to include in the 
analysis or what factors to control). 
9. See, e.g., James K. Skipper, Jr., Anthony L. Guenther & Gilbert Nass, The Sacredness of .05: A 
Note Concerning the Uses of Statistical Levels of Signiﬁcance in Social Science, 2 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 
16 (1967). 
10. See, e.g., Roger E. Kirk, Practical Signiﬁcance: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 56 EDUC. & 
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 746 (1996). 
11. As will become clear, I do not conclude that courts should never look to effect size when as-
sessing whether there is a prima facie disparate impact or suitable alternative policy. For in-
stance, in assessing a suitable alternative policy with less discriminatory impact, courts 
should look to a comparison of effect sizes, asking whether the suitable alternative policy’s 
disparate impact is of a magnitude lesser than that of the challenged policy. See infra Part II. 
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i .  foundations: disparate impact and statistical concepts 
This Part provides an overview of disparate impact litigation and its three-
stage burden-shifting framework: the plaintiff ’s prima facie demonstration of a 
disparate impact, the defendant’s job-related business necessity defense, and 
the plaintiff ’s demonstration of a suitable alternative policy with less discrimi-
natory impact. Then, I describe disparate impact theory’s fundamental aims, 
the purpose of each stage, and the two key statistical concepts: statistical sig-
niﬁcance and practical signiﬁcance. The discussion of practical signiﬁcance out-
lines the fundamentally different aspects of practical signiﬁcance testing that 
courts use: “magnitude inquiries” evaluate whether an effect is sufficiently 
large to be legally relevant, while “conﬁdence inquiries” evaluate whether sta-
tistical evidence sufficiently supports a claim. For instance, in evaluating 
whether a prima facie showing of disparate impact has been made, a court 
might examine whether the impact is sufficiently large (for instance, is a one 
percent disparity legally relevant?) or whether the evidence supports the claim 
that the policy caused a disparity. 
A. Disparate Impact: A Brief Overview 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits workplace discrimination 
on the basis of protected characteristics: race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin.
12
 In early opinions, courts read the Act to protect individuals against in-
tentional discrimination.
13
 In 1971, the Supreme Court articulated a broader 
understanding of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the landmark decision 
that introduced disparate impact theory.
14
 Griggs held that Title VII prohibits 
“not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation.”
15
 This theory of disparate impact allows a plaintiff to 
recover when an employer implements a test or policy that adversely affects a 
protected group. Unlike disparate treatment, disparate impact does not require 
employer animus or particular intentions.
16
 The “touchstone” of disparate im-
 
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2012)). 
13. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
14. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
15. Id. at 431. 
16. See Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1428 (10th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing 
disparate impact from intentional discrimination by noting that disparate impact “does not 
require proof of discriminatory motive or intent”). For a more recent statement comparing 
disparate impact and disparate treatment, see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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pact theory, according to the Griggs Court, is business necessity.
17
 In order to 
justify a practice that has a discriminatory impact, an employer must show that 
the disparity-causing practice is a business necessity. 
Post-Griggs decisions reﬁned disparate impact theory. Notably, in 1975, the 
Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody outlined a three-part burden-shifting 
framework for disparate impact litigation.
18
 The Supreme Court stepped back 
from this approach in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
19
 limiting Griggs by 
modifying the standard of business necessity to require merely a “legitimate 
business justiﬁcation” for a discriminatory practice.
20
 But two years later, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 superseded Wards Cove, restoring the disparate impact 
framework preceding Wards Cove.
21
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codiﬁed disparate impact theory developed in 
case law, including the three-part burden-shifting framework from Albemarle 
Paper Co.
22
 Under this framework, the plaintiff (the employee) must ﬁrst make 
a prima facie demonstration that a policy or practice has a disparate impact on 
the plaintiff ’s protected class.
23
 Next, the defendant (the employer) must 
demonstrate that its policy or practice is “job related” and “consistent with 
business necessity.”
24
 If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff has the 
burden of demonstrating that there is a suitable alternative employment prac-
tice with less discriminatory impact.
25
 The plaintiff can recover if the employer 
fails to meet its burden at the second stage or if the plaintiff meets his or her 
burden at the third stage. 
 
17. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited . . . . Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that 
any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.”). 
18. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
19. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
20. Id. at 660. 
21. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codiﬁed in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (rejecting the Wards Cove standard and adopting the Griggs and 
Albemarle standard). 
22. Id.; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 624 (2009) (explaining that the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 formally codiﬁed Title VII disparate impact theory as it stood prior to Wards Cove). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
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This language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicates an intention to codi-
fy the principles of Griggs and its legacy,
26
 including the three-part burden-
shifting test articulated in Albemarle Paper.
27
 It also echoes the language of job-
relatedness and business necessity: after the prima facie demonstration of ad-
verse impact, a defendant must “demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”
28
 
B. Motivations and Purposes 
Griggs articulates a simple but powerful antisubordination principle:
29
 em-
ployment practices must be revised such that protected classiﬁcations become 
irrelevant.
30
 Any unnecessary and discriminatory employment practice—
 
26. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
27. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971); see also Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1525 n.34 (5th Cir. 1993) (remarking 
on the law’s return to a pre-Wards Cove standard after the Civil Rights Act’s passage); Joseph 
A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Ap-
proach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 103 n.55 (2006) (“Congress provided that the statute 
should be read ‘in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the 
concept of ‘alternative employment practice’ for claims of disparate impact. Wards Cove was 
decided on June 5, 1989.” (citation omitted)). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
431. 
29. There are various important reﬁnements of antisubordination, equal status, and anticaste 
theory. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 
(1976); see also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1003 (1986); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving 
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994); cf. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW 
THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 120-21 (2014) (“[P]art of the distinctive appeal of equal 
opportunity is that it enables people to pursue goals in life that are to a greater degree their 
own, rather than being dictated by the limited opportunities that were available to them. 
Unequal opportunities, most obviously when they take the form of social structures like a 
caste system, a class system, or a gender role system, limit the kinds of lives people can 
lead . . . . [E]qual opportunity . . . gives each of us more of a chance to . . . become . . . ‘part 
author of his life.’” (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 370 (1986)). But see 
Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 
353 (2008) (arguing that there are limits to antisubordination theory). 
30. “Congress has not commanded that the less qualiﬁed be preferred over the better qualiﬁed 
simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualiﬁcations as such, Con-
gress has made such qualiﬁcations the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, 
and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must meas-
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intentional or unintentional, of large or small magnitude—must be removed. 
The primary purpose of disparate impact is antisubordination. Discriminatory 
employment practices should be removed so that protected classiﬁcations be-
come irrelevant. As the Griggs Court put it, the fundamental aim of Title VII is 
“the removal of artiﬁcial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or 
other impermissible classiﬁcation.”
31
 
Of course, the goal of antisubordination has an unavoidable limit. It does 
not entirely “preclude[] the use of [employment] testing or measuring proce-
dures.”
32
 In the absence of a less discriminatory alternative, policies that have a 
disparate impact may be permitted if “they are demonstrably a reasonable 
measure of job performance.”
33
 Therefore, when the goal of antisubordination 
and a legitimate business interest clash, disparate impact is tolerated—to an ex-
tent—for the sake of business interests that are sufficiently substantial and in 
the absence of an alternative policy of less discriminatory impact. 
The overarching antisubordination aim and the business necessity limit in-
form the structure of the three-part burden-shifting framework.
34
 First, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact: “that a [de-
fendant] uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
35
 Then, the plaintiff 
must identify a discriminatory employment practice, one that functions to 
make a protected status like race relevant. The employer can also demonstrate 
that the practice does not cause the disparate impact: “If the [defendant] 
demonstrates that a speciﬁc employment practice does not cause the disparate 
impact, the [defendant] shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice 
is required by business necessity.”
36
 In rebuttal, the defendant must demon-
strate that “the challenged practice is job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity.”
37
 Note that the practice must not only 
be related to the job, but must also be a reasonable measure of job perfor-
mance, one that justiﬁes a departure from disparate impact’s primary aim to 
 
ure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (em-
phasis added). 
31. Id. at 431. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
35. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
36. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii). 
37. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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make factors like race and religion irrelevant. Finally, even if the discriminatory 
practice is job related and consistent with business necessity, the plaintiff may 
succeed by presenting an alternative employment practice
38
 that also serves the 
employer’s legitimate interests “without a similarly undesirable [discriminato-
ry] effect” but that the respondent refuses to adopt.
39
 The fundamental pur-
pose of this three-part framework is to eliminate unnecessary and discrimina-
tory employment barriers. Some discriminatory barriers might be business 
necessities—barriers that have been permitted despite the motivation to make 
factors like race irrelevant. Yet if there is an alternative policy that serves the 
same purpose without equal discriminatory impact, the employer must adopt 
that policy instead. 
The fundamental aim of antisubordination might be achieved in court or 
out of court. Although it is easy to focus primarily on disparate impact litiga-
tion, successful lawsuits are only one way through which disparate impact law 
might dismantle unnecessary and discriminatory barriers to employment. An-
other, less costly way that disparate impact law serves its function is by creating 
incentives for employers to remove problematic and unlawful barriers to em-
ployment before litigation commences. 
C. Statistical Concepts 
Several statistical concepts are relevant to disparate impact analysis. Here, I 
detail the most important concepts for the purposes of this Note: statistical 
signiﬁcance and practical signiﬁcance. 
1. Statistical Signiﬁcance 
Statistical signiﬁcance is a concept that is frequently applied to empirical re-
sults. One of the most common forms in which statistical signiﬁcance is ex-
pressed is through a p-value (e.g., “p < .05”). A p-value is the probability of ob-
taining results that are at least as extreme as if the null hypothesis were true. 
Smaller p-values provide evidence that is less consistent with the null hypothe-
sis. 
In the context of Title VII employment discrimination litigation, a null hy-
pothesis might assume equal selection rates by an employer among different 
racial applicant groups. For instance, suppose the evidence shows that a policy 
differentially rejects blacks and that this difference is statistically signiﬁcant 
 
38. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
39. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
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with a p-value of ﬁve percent. This means that, assuming equal selection rates 
for each group, there is a ﬁve percent chance of arriving at a difference in selec-
tion rates of equal or greater magnitude. 
In disparate impact analysis (and elsewhere), p-values should be interpret-
ed cautiously; statistical signiﬁcance testing should not be relied upon in isola-
tion.
40
 In a recent volume, the American Statistical Association summarized 
some of the key principles and ﬂaws in how p-values have been used in empiri-
cal analysis:
41
 
1. p-values can indicate how incompatible the data are with the model 
being tested. 
2. p-values do not tell you the probability the model is true or the 
probability the data are random. 
3. No decision—scientiﬁc, business, legal or otherwise—should be 
based solely on p-values passing a cutoff value (i.e., a “bright line,” such 
as p < .01 or .05). 
4. The proper understanding of statistical tests requires full reporting 
and transparency (i.e., report all statistical analyses and p-values; do 
not cherry-pick results to be reported). 
5. A p-value does not indicate the size or importance of an effect that is 
obtained, no matter how small the p-value is (and large p-values do not 
tell you that an effect does not exist, only that it is not supported by the 
data). 
6. The p-value does not tell you how good your model or hypothesis is 
(i.e. a high p-value may support the null hypothesis, yet many other 
models might also be supported by the data).
42
 
 
40. See, e.g., Rick Jacobs, Kevin Murphy & Jay Silva, Unintended Consequences of EEO Enforce-
ment Policies: Being Big Is Worse than Being Bad, 28 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 467, 468 (2013) (ex-
plaining that in “statistical power analysis, with large samples even very small differences in 
outcomes will be statistically signiﬁcant”) (citation omitted); Kevin R. Murphy & Rick R. 
Jacobs, Using Effect Size Measures To Reform the Determination of Adverse Impact in Equal Em-
ployment Litigation, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y  & L. 477, 496 (2012) (recommending that “effect 
size measure be combined with tests of statistical signiﬁcance, either through the joint re-
porting of effect sizes and p values or through minimum-effect tests when evaluating ad-
verse impact”). 
41. Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA’s Statement on p-Values: Context, Process, 
and Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016). 
42. Frederick L. Oswald, Eric M. Dunleavy & Amy Shaw, Measuring Practical Signiﬁcance in Ad-
verse Impact Analysis, in ADVERSE IMPACT ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING DATA, STATISTICS, AND 
RISK (Scott B. Morris & Eric M. Dunleavy eds., 2017). 
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These lessons highlight the dangers of relying solely on p-values or inter-
preting them inappropriately.
43
 For instance, “p = .05” does not mean that the 
null hypothesis has only a ﬁve percent chance of being true, nor does it mean 
that the observed data would occur only ﬁve percent of the time under the null 
hypothesis.
44
 A p-value is simply the probability of the observed result or a 
more extreme result occurring, given that the null hypothesis is true. It is im-
portant to remember that a p-value is calculated on the assumption that the 
null hypothesis is true. Therefore, the p-value is not the probability that the 
null hypothesis is false. 
Consider what p-values can tell us in disparate impact analysis. Suppose 
our null hypothesis is that there is no racial effect of a business’s hiring policy. 
That is, the null hypothesis is that any difference in hiring rates between two 
racial groups is simply due to chance. If the real-world data indicate a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference in the employer’s hiring rates between black and 
white groups with a p-value of less than ﬁve percent, we have learned that, as-
suming no racial effect, we would ﬁnd a difference in white and black hiring 
rates at least this extreme less than ﬁve percent of the time. The data do not tell 
us that there is less than a ﬁve percent chance that the racial disparity is due to 
chance. 
2. Practical Signiﬁcance 
Practical signiﬁcance refers to the real-world import of a statistical ﬁnding. 
In disparate impact cases, the term is used in two notably different ways. One 
is to refer to a “magnitude inquiry,” an analysis of the magnitude of a result 
supported by statistical evidence—for instance, the size of the effect indicated 
by a statistically signiﬁcant ﬁnding. The other is a “conﬁdence inquiry,” an 
analysis of the strength of the inference drawn between statistical evidence and 
the conclusion one draws from it about the real world. 
 
43. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Strangely Persistent “Transposition Fallacy”: Why “Statistically 
Signiﬁcant” Evidence of Discrimination May Not Be Signiﬁcant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437 (1998); D.H. 
Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Signiﬁcance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333 (1986); Ramona L. 
Paetzold, Problems with Statistical Signiﬁcance in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 26 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 395 (1991). 
44. See Steven Goodman, A Dirty Dozen: Twelve P-Value Misconceptions, 45 SEMINARS HEMATOL-
OGY 135, 136-37 (2008). 
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A magnitude inquiry is an assessment of the size of an effect.
45
 For instance, 
a statistically signiﬁcant effect can be small in size. Suppose there is evidence 
that an employer had a hiring pool of ten thousand applicants. A ﬁve percent 
racial disparate impact might be statistically signiﬁcant given the large sample 
size, but nevertheless deemed to have a small effect size, since some may think 
that a ﬁve percent difference is “small” in size.
46
 Of course, whether an effect 
size is “large” or “small” is fundamentally a conventional or normative judg-
ment and not derived purely from statistical analysis. 
In contrast, a conﬁdence inquiry is an assessment of the strength of the evi-
dence, which asks how strong the inference is between the evidence and the 
claim it supports about the world. For instance, we might evaluate the statisti-
cal evidence of an observed disparity by asking whether it really supports the 
existence of a real-world disparity caused by the hiring policy in question. Im-
agine that statistical evidence suggests a three percent disparity in the hiring 
rates of black and white applicants. Courts might ask whether this result is 
practically signiﬁcant in the sense of whether this evinces any real-world dis-
parity. This aspect of practical signiﬁcance is important, but it is also a standard 
inquiry: we can, should, and do regularly ask whether any piece of evidence is 
practically signiﬁcant in this second sense. 
Even an effect with a size that is considered “medium” or “large” in the ﬁrst 
sense might be deemed as having little practical signiﬁcance in the second 
sense, especially when the evidence is based on a small sample size. For in-
stance, suppose an employer has a hiring pool of ten applicants, half from one 
group and half from another, and a hiring test excludes all but three.
47
 Even if 
the difference in hiring rates suggested by this evidence is of large magnitude, 
we might doubt the real-world inference of a disparate impact supported by 
these results. 
This distinction—practical signiﬁcance as a measure of a disparity’s magni-
tude vs. practical signiﬁcance as a measure of conﬁdence in the strength of evi-
 
45. For the seminal conventional standards of effect size, see Jacob Cohen, A Power Primer, 112 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 155 (1992), which describes “small,” “medium,” and “large” effects for vari-
ous statistical tests. 
46. In the context of disparate impact, the EEOC’s four-ﬁfths rule is essentially an effect size 
rule: a selection rate for any protected group that is less than four-ﬁfths of the rate for the 
group with the highest rate is generally regarded as evidence of adverse impact. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1607.4(D) (2015). Based on the guideline, if the size of the rate difference is big enough, 
this supports prima facie adverse impact. See infra Section II.A. 
47. Even in the best case, this produces a ratio less than that advised by the four-ﬁfths rule. As-
suming three are selected, in the best case, the test admits one member from one class and 
two from the other. The ratio (.5) of acceptances is less than .8. For more on the four-ﬁfths 
rule, see infra Section II.A. 
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dence—is crucial. This Note focuses on magnitude inquiries. This is not to say, 
however, that evaluation of the inference between statistical evidence and the 
real world is irrelevant. To the contrary, such evaluations should remain fun-
damental at each stage. 
Consider another example. Suppose a company has reviewed applications 
from one hundred candidates, forty-ﬁve of whom are white and ﬁfty-ﬁve of 
whom are black. The application requires a hair follicle drug test, which more 
white applicants pass. By conventional standards (signiﬁcance determined by p 
< .05), the effect of race is on the border of statistical signiﬁcance. Depending 
on the assumptions, different statistical tests lead to different results.
48
 This 
demonstrates an important but overlooked feature of statistical signiﬁcance 
testing: Despite its allure of objectivity, its results vary based on its assump-
tions. 
Regardless of statistical signiﬁcance, the effect’s practical signiﬁcance re-
mains. First, consider the “magnitude” aspect of practical signiﬁcance: what do 
these statistical analyses imply about the magnitude of the disparity? A conven-
tional measure of effect size suggests that this is a “small” or “weak” effect 
size.
49
 But we can still ask about the “conﬁdence” aspect of practical signiﬁ-
cance: how strongly do these statistical facts (including our analysis of effect 
size) support the existence of any real-world disparity? In other words, how 
strong is the evidence of a disparity? 
Although there is an important distinction between two aspects of practical 
signiﬁcance—magnitude and conﬁdence—authorities sometimes emphasize 
only one aspect. Consider the Federal Judicial Center’s deﬁnition, which under-
stands practical signiﬁcance only in terms of magnitude: practical signiﬁcance 
means that “the magnitude of the effect being studied is not de minimis—it is 
sufficiently important substantively for the court to be concerned.”
50
 Some 
courts have adopted a similar understanding of practical signiﬁcance. In Frazier 
v. Garrison I.S.D., the Fifth Circuit held that a 4.5% difference in selection rates 
did not have sufficient practical signiﬁcance when 95% of applicants were se-
lected.
51
 The Frazier Court justiﬁed its decision by citing a case in which it had 
previously held 
 
48. Fisher’s Exact Test indicates this is “statistically signiﬁcant,” p = .049. A χ2 test indicates that 
this falls above the standard (p < .05) cutoff: p = .079. 
49. For example, Cramér’s V = .176, indicating a small effect size. 
50. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 292 (3d ed.  
2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SciMan3D01.pdf/$ﬁle/SciMan3D01.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5WJG-64PA]. 
51. 980 F.2d 1514, 1526 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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that employment examinations having a 7.1 percentage point differen-
tial between black and white test takers do not, as a matter of law, state a 
prima facie case of disparate impact. Therefore [in this case in which 
the difference is 4.5 percentage points], there is no signiﬁcant statistical 
discrepancy between minority and non-minority pass rates.
52
 
Thus, the court applied a practical signiﬁcance requirement in the sense of 
a magnitude inquiry. This was not an inquiry into how strongly the evidence 
supported the possibility of a real-world disparity. The Frazier Court was es-
sentially performing a logical deduction: since a 7.1% difference was not big 
enough to constitute prima facie disparate impact, a 4.5% difference was also 
insufficiently large. 
i i .  disparate statistics 
Statistics play a crucial role at each of the three stages of disparate impact 
litigation: the plaintiff ’s prima facie case of disparate impact, the defendant’s 
rebuttal relating to job-relatedness and business necessity, and the plaintiff ’s 
demonstration of a suitable alternative practice. This Part outlines the role of 
statistics at each stage and presents arguments for the appropriate use of statis-
tics and “practical signiﬁcance” inquiries at each stage. 
Section II.A argues that many courts inappropriately conduct magnitude 
inquiries at the prima facie stage of disparate impact analysis. Scrutinizing a 
disparity’s “practical signiﬁcance” through a magnitude inquiry at the prima 
facie stage is to ask whether the disparity is big enough to warrant the court’s 
attention. This question is antithetical to the statutory text, purpose, and prec-
edents of disparate impact law. 
Section II.B argues that a robust magnitude inquiry is more appropriate at 
the second stage of disparate impact analysis. Although such a requirement is 
incongruous at the prima facie stage, it is apt when assessing the merit of an 
employer’s rebuttal that some disparity-causing policy is a job-related business 
necessity—employers must demonstrate that a disparity-causing test has large 
enough relevance to justify permitting discriminatory impact on the basis of 
certain legitimate business interests. A magnitude inquiry at this rebuttal stage 
is more consistent with disparate impact law. 
Comparatively fewer cases proceed to the third stage of disparate impact 
analysis: the plaintiff ’s proposal of a less discriminatory alternative policy. Sec-
 
52. Id. at 1524 (citing Moore v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curi-
am)). 
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tion II.C argues that the logic underlying the elimination of magnitude inquir-
ies during the prima facie stage applies to the third stage as well. Just as the 
aim of the ﬁrst stage is to identify a policy that causes any disparity, the aim of 
the third stage is to identify an alternative policy that provides any decrease in 
discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs should not be required to show that their pro-
posal reduces discrimination by a particular magnitude. As long as the proposal 
satisﬁes the employer’s legitimate interest without a similarly undesirable effect 
on potential or current employees, the plaintiffs should be found to have met 
their burden. 
A. The Statistical Standard of Prima Facie Disparate Impact 
The plaintiff typically provides evidence of statistically signiﬁcant dispari-
ties to help support the prima facie demonstration of a disparate impact.
53
 
Courts adopt a variety of approaches in assessing these disparities. One com-
mon approach is to adopt thresholds based on standard deviations.
54
 Some 
courts hold that disparities not rising to a certain level of statistical signiﬁcance 
are insufficient proof of disparate impact.
55
 
 
53. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (noting that statis-
tical analysis is probative in demonstrating prima facie disparate impact). The Court sug-
gests that statistically signiﬁcant tests are probative since they can uncover covert discrimi-
nation: “Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one 
only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent ex-
planation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time 
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the 
population in the community from which employees are hired.” Id. at 339 n.20. The Court 
also quotes United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, stating, “In many cases the only available 
avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination 
by the employer or union involved.” Id. (quoting 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971)). This is a 
blurring of disparate impact and disparate treatment theory. But the reasoning extends: sta-
tistics can uncover intentional or covert causes of discrimination and also causes of discrimi-
nation that are unintentional. 
54. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977) (stating that 
“two or three standard deviations” indicates a disparate impact of gross signiﬁcance, making 
“suspect” the hypothesis that hiring was conducted “without regard to race” (citing Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977))). 
55. See, e.g., Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep’t of Fire & Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 
2000) (race); Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir. 1998) (age); 
Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (gender). 
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Other courts adopt the EEOC’s “four-ﬁfths” or “eighty percent” rule as a 
standard for measuring prima facie disparate impact.
56
 The four-ﬁfths rule 
compares the ratio of selection rates between the rate of selection for the pro-
tected class and the greatest rate of selection for any group and asks whether 
this ratio is less than four-ﬁfths. The Supreme Court famously branded the 
four-ﬁfths rule as one that “has not provided more than a rule of thumb.”
57
 
Moreover, the EEOC guidance itself acknowledges that “[s]maller differences 
in selection rate may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are 
signiﬁcant in both statistical and practical terms or where a user’s actions have 
discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race, sex, or ethnic 
group.”
58
 In other words, the four-ﬁfths rule yields at most a ﬁrst cut of easily 
decided cases of prima facie disparate impact: a prima facie case is demonstrat-
ed by group selection rates with a ratio below four-ﬁfths, but smaller differ-
ences (i.e., larger ratios) require further scrutiny. 
These guidelines—statistical signiﬁcance (and other measures like standard 
deviation analysis) and the four-ﬁfths rule—can be combined with each other. 
For instance, a court might adopt an analysis that looks ﬁrst to the four-ﬁfths 
rule and then to statistical signiﬁcance for data failing the four-ﬁfths rule. The 
four-ﬁfths rule is essentially a guideline that takes practical signiﬁcance into ac-
count, allowing prima facie impact to be established when the effect size (dis-
parity) is large enough. The guideline might also be supplemented by an inter-
pretation that holds practical signiﬁcance is not established where the disparity 
is insufficiently large. This is the magnitude inquiry debate at the heart of the 
circuit split. 
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that the essence of demonstrat-
ing a prima facie disparate impact is showing statistically signiﬁcant evidence 
of a disparity.
59
 This view was recently reaffirmed in Ricci v. DeStefano: “[A] 
 
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2016) (“A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is 
less than four-ﬁfths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate 
will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse im-
pact, while a greater than four-ﬁfths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforce-
ment agencies as evidence of adverse impact.”). For a history of the four-ﬁfths test, see DAN 
BIDDLE, ADVERSE IMPACT AND TEST VALIDATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO VALID AND DE-
FENSIBLE EMPLOYMENT TESTING (2d ed. 2006). 
57. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 
557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (noting that the four-ﬁfths rule “is ‘a rule of thumb for the courts’” 
(quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3)). 
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D). 
59. For Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the fundamentality of a “signiﬁcantly” different 
statistical disparity, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); N.Y.C Transit Auth. v. 
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prima facie case of disparate-impact liability [is] essentially, a threshold show-
ing of a signiﬁcant statistical disparity . . . and nothing more . . . .”
60
 The Court 
characterized the prima facie demonstration as one not requiring a disparity of 
any particular magnitude. This reaffirms the core commitment of disparate 
impact theory: “Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or other-
wise.”
61
 
There are various considerations weighing against magnitude inquiries at 
the prima facie stage of disparate impact analysis, such as deﬁnitions of “dis-
parate impact”
62
 and the legislative history of the relevant statutes.
63
 
Statutory text and Supreme Court precedent demonstrate that practical 
signiﬁcance is irrelevant at the prima facie stage. According to Title VII, a com-
plaining party must demonstrate “that a respondent uses a particular employ-
ment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin . . . .”
64
 The text indicates that a plaintiff must show a 
disparate impact, not a substantial, notable, large, or even signiﬁcant disparate 
impact. A conﬁdence inquiry is relevant in determining whether the evidence 
presented supports causation, but there is no basis in the text for a magnitude 
inquiry, which asks whether the evidence supports a disparate impact that is 
big enough to be worth proceeding.  
Supreme Court precedent supports the same interpretation. Griggs inter-
prets Title VII as aimed at the removal of unnecessary barriers that have a dis-
criminatory impact in employment: 
What is required by Congress is the removal of artiﬁcial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate 
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermis-
sible classiﬁcation. Congress has now provided that tests or criteria 
for employment or promotion may not provide equality of oppor-
 
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 586 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); and 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971). 
60. 557 U.S. at 587 (citing Teal, 457 U.S. at 446). 
61. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). 
62. For discussions of the relevance of dictionary deﬁnitions to textualist arguments, see Jones v. 
City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 2014), which discusses deﬁnitions; Ko supra note 1, at 
888-90, which argues that the dictionary deﬁnition of “disparate impact” also supports de-
clining practical signiﬁcance inquiries at the prima facie stage. But see Eissenstat, supra note 
1, at 670 (contesting the First Circuit’s analysis of deﬁnitions in Jones). 
63. For legislative history considerations, see Ko, supra note 1, at 890-92, which argues that the 
legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1990, and 1991 supports declining practi-
cal signiﬁcance inquiries at the prima facie stage. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012). 
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tunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and 
the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now required that the pos-
ture and condition of the job seeker be taken into account. It has—
to resort again to the fable—provided that the vessel in which the 
milk is proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not 
only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair in form, 
but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessi-
ty. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes 
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is 
prohibited.
65
 
This well-known passage is worth careful attention. As Griggs interprets Ti-
tle VII, Congress is not concerned only about the barriers that cause the largest 
disparities; rather, if an unnecessary barrier causes any disparity, the barrier 
must be removed. Albemarle Paper reinforces this early understanding.
66
 
Considering practical signiﬁcance at the prima facie stage is equally incon-
sistent with recent Supreme Court opinions on disparate impact. Recall Ricci’s 
straightforward avowal: “[A] prima facie case of disparate-impact liability [is] 
essentially, a threshold showing of a signiﬁcant statistical disparity . . .  and 
nothing more . . . .”
67
 Inquiry into a disparity’s size is unambiguously some-
thing more. It is also worth noting the unanimity in understanding given the 
ideological diversity represented among the authors and signers of just these 
two opinions. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion in Griggs on behalf of a 
unanimous Court; four decades later, Justice Kennedy wrote the Ricci opinion 
on behalf of the Court’s conservatives. Requiring a demonstration of this suffi-
cient magnitude aspect of practical signiﬁcance entails a subjective verdict on 
the importance of some (“small”) disparity. This is at odds with the textual ba-
sis, aims, and precedent (from Griggs to Ricci
68
) of prima facie disparate impact 
demonstration. 
This argument raises two important questions: (1) how does the argument 
square with the four-ﬁfths rule, a commonly accepted mode of inquiring into 
practical signiﬁcance; and (2) if magnitude inquiries are so clearly inappropri-
 
65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
66. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
67. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 
(1982)). 
68. Id.; Griggs, 401 U.S. 424. 
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ate at the prima facie stage, why is there a controversial circuit split on the is-
sue?
69
 
Although rejecting a prima facie case on the basis of practical signiﬁcance is 
inappropriate, many courts look to practical signiﬁcance as a shorthand to 
demonstrate a prima facie disparate impact through the four-ﬁfths rule.
70
 The 
four-ﬁfths rule has an air of objectivity: if the hiring rate for the impacted 
group is lower than this sharp cut-off—eighty percent of the rate for the fa-
vored group—then there is a prima facie disparate impact. But this rule has 
different effects depending on selection rates. For instance, if a favored group is 
hired at a rate of twenty percent, then any impacted-group hiring rate less than 
sixteen percent would establish prima facie disparate impact. But if a favored 
group is hired at a ninety-ﬁve percent rate, then any impacted-group hiring 
rate less than seventy-six percent would establish the prima facie case. In other 
words, based on the hiring base rate, the four-ﬁfths rule’s guidance ﬂuctuates 
between a group-group difference of zero to twenty percent. 
Crucially, the EEOC’s characterization of the four-ﬁfths rule advises that 
any rate less than four-ﬁfths of the higher selection rate establishes the prima 
facie case without showing further practical signiﬁcance, but smaller differ-
ences may “nevertheless constitute adverse impact” if those differences are sta-
tistically and practically signiﬁcant.
71
 In other words, the four-ﬁfths rule advis-
es granting the demonstration of prima facie disparate impact under certain 
conditions, but it never advises denying it on such a basis. Smaller differences 
should be considered in further detail to determine whether they evince prima 
facie disparate impact. 
The four-ﬁfths rule is essentially a practical signiﬁcance guideline that 
functions as a ceiling, not a ﬂoor. If the effect size is large enough, there is a 
prima facie disparate impact. A number of other courts have suggested that 
something beyond mere statistical signiﬁcance should be required in demon-
 
69. See discussion supra note 7. 
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2016) (“A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is 
less than four-ﬁfths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate 
will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse im-
pact, while a greater than four-ﬁfths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforce-
ment agencies as evidence of adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection rate may never-
theless constitute adverse impact, where they are signiﬁcant in both statistical and practical 
terms or where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds 
of race, sex, or ethnic group.”). See generally Scott W. McKinley, The Need for Legislative or 
Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and How Employers in the Sixth Circuit Can Survive the 
Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171, 182-85 (2008) (describing the use of the four-ﬁfths rule 
among several circuits). 
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D). 
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strating the prima facie case of disparate impact.
72
 This requirement is a 
demonstration of a certain form of “practical signiﬁcance”: the statistically sig-
niﬁcant result must evince a substantial disparity. 
Now consider the second question. If practical signiﬁcance inquiries are so 
clearly inappropriate at the prima facie stage, why is there a circuit split? Recall 
that the First Circuit rejected a practical signiﬁcance requirement in Jones v. City 
of Boston, but the Fifth Circuit held that a disparate job selection rate was too 
small to establish a prima facie case in Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D.
73
 Part of the an-
swer, I suspect, is that some courts prefer a thoughtful, contextual analysis of 
the evidence that supports the prima facie disparate impact. A contextualized 
inquiry—for instance, examining sample size, statistical signiﬁcance, and effect 
size—is appropriate in a conﬁdence inquiry. It is inappropriate, however, for 
courts to smuggle a magnitude inquiry ﬂoor into a conﬁdence inquiry. At the 
prima facie stage, courts should ask whether the evidence supports a ﬁnding of 
disparate impact, not what amount of disparate impact merits attention. 
Magnitude inquiries are a necessarily subjective practice. Frazier held that a 
4.5% difference was trivial, when ninety-ﬁve percent of applicants were select-
ed.
74
 The justiﬁcation for such reasoning is unclear: Would a 4.5% difference 
be more relevant if only eighty percent of applicants were selected? What if on-
ly thirty percent of applicants were selected? 
Conﬁdence inquiries are appropriately contextual. There are many factors 
to consider in a conﬁdence inquiry. When evaluating how strongly the evi-
dence supports the existence of a disparate impact, courts might look to the 
statistical evidence’s sample size, the size of the respective group categories, and 
even the effect size. 
But the subjective contextualism of a magnitude inquiry is more danger-
ous. Determining what magnitude of disparate impact is sufficient to demon-
strate a prima facie disparate impact allows—and invites—judgment about the 
importance of some disparate impact on a protected class. This allows lines to 
be drawn differently in different contexts. For instance, some jurisdictions 
might consider a ﬁve percent hiring difference signiﬁcant, while others might 
 
72. See, e.g., Bos. Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1974). 
73. See sources cited supra note 1 (describing critical commentary of the First Circuit’s decision 
in Jones). Compare Jones v. City of Bos., 752 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2014) (rejecting a practical 
signiﬁcance requirement), with Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1524 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a 4.5% difference in selection rates was trivial when 95% of applicants were se-
lected and citing Moore v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979), 
for the proposition that the use of employment examinations with a 7.1% difference between 
black and white examinees does not constitute a prima facie case of disparate impact).  
74. 980 F.2d at 1524. 
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consider the difference trivial. This injects subjectivity into the core of disparate 
impact analysis. Moreover, it contradicts the text of Title VII and Supreme 
Court precedent, which require plaintiffs to identify a disparate impact—and 
nothing more. 
To be more precise, one reason that practical signiﬁcance testing at the pri-
ma facie stage is ever invoked is that courts consider an impact’s magnitude in 
the name of practical signiﬁcance, when they really are invoking the conﬁdence 
inquiry aspect of practical signiﬁcance. This is a statistical fallacy. While conﬁ-
dence inquiries are an appropriate consideration at the stage of prima facie dis-
parate impact, and effect size can serve as relevant evidence for a conﬁdence in-
quiry, a magnitude inquiry is not in itself necessary to satisfy a conﬁdence in-
inquiry. It may be that courts commit the fallacy of requiring consideration of 
what is merely one source of possible evidence. The relevant, crucial question 
at the prima facie demonstration stage is this: is there good evidence that the 
policy caused some disparity? Evidence of a large disparity helps build conﬁ-
dence in the proof of some (perhaps even smaller) disparity. But evidence of a 
large disparity is not required. In some cases, we expect it to be absent—
namely, when there is a small real-world disparity. 
A similar confusion underlies appeals to the four-ﬁfths rule. The theory of 
disparate impact does not privilege “large” disparities over “smaller, insubstan-
tial” disparities. The appropriate justiﬁcation for recommending acceptance of 
“big” disparities as clear evidence of prima facie disparate impact is not that 
they reﬂect big real-world disparities. Rather, such evidence typically inspires 
more conﬁdence than evidence of smaller disparities that some real disparity 
exists. Smaller differences are no less important, but smaller differences gener-
ally provide less conﬁdence that any difference exists (sample size and all else 
equal). The exception that proves this rule is a case like Jones,
75
 where there is a 
small effect size but a very large sample size, supporting the court’s conﬁdence 
that the disparity is not the product of chance. 
Thus, the four-ﬁfths rule really ought to be a “rule of thumb.”
76
 As the 
EEOC guidance recommends, smaller differences than advised by the rule 
should not be rejected as insufficient proof of prima facie disparate impact; in-
stead, they should be scrutinized more closely.
77
 
 
75. 752 F.3d 38. 
76. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988). 
77. Note that this interpretation is consistent with deference to the EEOC, a concern of some 
commentators. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 70, at 182-83; Eissenstat, supra note 1, at 669; 
Ko, supra note 1, at 894. 
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These considerations also indicate an important way in which the standard 
for prima facie disparate impact demonstration should be strong. It is possible 
that some statistical evidence for “large” differences over the four-ﬁfth rule’s 
cutoff are actually unconvincing evidence. The most intuitive example is evi-
dence involving a small sample. Imagine ﬁve people, two white and three 
black, apply for a job. The two white applicants and one black applicant are not 
excluded by the company’s policy. This involves an enormous disparity be-
tween white-applicant and black-applicant hiring rates. Yet, this does not give 
us conﬁdence that the defendant’s policy caused a disparate impact. According-
ly, courts have recognized the limited value of small sample sizes in disparate 
impact cases.
78
 This exempliﬁes the appropriateness of a conﬁdence inquiry. 
This is made all the more complicated by the multiple meanings of “practi-
cal signiﬁcance.” Some courts use it to analyze the magnitude of a disparity,
79
 
which I argue is inappropriate at the prima facie stage. Yet other courts refer to 
practical signiﬁcance when pointing to a worry about the conﬁdence in a statis-
tically signiﬁcant difference.
80
 Unlike the former, the latter is a legitimate in-
quiry at the prima facie stage of disparate impact. 
This issue is not merely terminological. Judges writing in support of a 
“practical signiﬁcance” requirement or inquiry should investigate which mean-
ing of practical signiﬁcance they intend to employ. For instance, when discuss-
ing whether a disparity is “substantial” (read in the magnitude sense),
81
 the 
First Circuit was concerned with whether the disparity was “due to chance” 
(closer to the sense of a conﬁdence inquiry), not whether the disparity was of a 
 
78. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463 n.7 (1982); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977); Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 
620-21 (1974); Dendy v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 431 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D.D.C. 1977); Rogillio v. 
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 446 F. Supp. 423, 427-28 (S.D. Tex. 1977). 
79. See, e.g., Jones, 752 F.3d 38. 
80. For instance, the court in United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1978) noted 
that adding two people from the not-passing-the-test group to the passing-the-test group 
changed a ﬁnding of statistical signiﬁcance. The court held the results were not practically 
signiﬁcant. See also Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) (endorsing a 
case-by-case approach to ﬁt the circumstances). In such cases, the court invokes practical 
signiﬁcance where they should invoke a worry about certainty. 
    In Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273 (9th Cir. 1981), two practical sig-
niﬁcance tests were discussed. One dealt with the effect of adding three people to the plain-
tiff group in a favorable way that eliminated four-ﬁfths rule of thumb conclusion. When the 
four-ﬁfths rule of thumb conclusion can be changed by adding only three people, the sample 
is considered unreliably small and of no practical signiﬁcance. 
81. Fudge v. Providence Fire Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1985). 
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certain magnitude.
82
 It is misleading to interpret these decisions as support for 
a practical signiﬁcance requirement in the sense of an inquiry into the sufficien-
cy of a disparity’s size. Practical signiﬁcance, in the sense of a disparity of requi-
site size, is distinct from conﬁdence in a statistically signiﬁcant result. 
Commentators also commit this error: 
On the one hand, statistical signiﬁcance allows plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that a particular practice causes some disparity between classes (the 
“disparate” prong of the inquiry); on the other, practical signiﬁcance 
determines if that disparity is large enough to have real-world implica-
tions (the “impact” prong of the inquiry).
 
Practices that do in fact cre-
ate a noticeable disparate impact would implicate both of these consid-
erations.
83
 
A prima facie case of disparate impact does not depend on whether we care 
sufficiently about the size of the impact; evidence of adverse impact establishes 
the prima facie case, even if that adverse impact is small. 
A tempting policy counterargument is that prohibiting magnitude inquiries 
at the prima facie stage would incentivize frivolous disparate impact litiga-
tion.
84
 But this claim underestimates the strength of the statistical signiﬁcance 
requirement. As Jones explained,
85
 requirements to show statistical signiﬁcance 
will frequently eliminate frivolous lawsuits, since small-sized impacts will re-
quire large sample sizes to demonstrate statistical signiﬁcance.
86
 Second, if the 
defendant shows job-related business necessity, the plaintiff will still have to 
prove an alternative practice with less impact. This will be relatively easier 
when the magnitude of the disparity is large, providing a balanced corrective.
87
 
In cases in which the prima facie impact is small, the plaintiff will still have a 
larger burden in the demonstration of an alternative practice since the alterna-
tive policy has less room to reduce the disparity than if the disparity were large. 
 
82. Id. at 657-58 (“Where the use of employment tests results in differential pass rates for blacks 
and whites, even an apparently substantial differential, the discrepancy may be due to 
chance. Statistical signiﬁcance and, in the case of so small a sample as the 1974 sample, we 
believe judicial signiﬁcance, can be attributed to an observed discrepancy only where there is 
a low probability that the differential in pass rates would be expected to occur simply by 
chance.” (internal citation omitted)). 
83. See Stenger, supra note 1, at 436. 
84. See id. 
85. Jones v. City of Bos., 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014). 
86. Id. at 53. 
87. Id. 
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A further reason not to fear a rise in trivial claims is that complainants have 
little personal incentive to bring disparate impact claims. Disparate impact re-
lief is limited to equitable relief and back pay. Compensatory and punitive 
damages are not available, as they are for disparate treatment claims.
88
 
A ﬁnal, but important, response to this counterargument concerns the logic 
of burden shifting in disparate impact litigation. The previously articulated re-
sponses address worries about an increase in frivolous employee complaints by 
justifying the unlikelihood of an effect on the complainant. But disallowing 
consideration of practical signiﬁcance at the prima facie stage might instead 
have an effect on employers. Knowing that any robustly proven disparity can 
shift the burden to the defendants can have an important effect outside of liti-
gation, encouraging employers to reﬂect on whether their policies and proce-
dures that have such an impact are actually job-related business necessities, or 
whether less discriminatory alternatives exist. One way of responding to poten-
tial litigation is to reinforce incentives for employers to eliminate the very prac-
tices and procedures that unnecessarily impact protected classes.
89
 Thus, con-
cern about the litigation effects of changing the statistical burden in fact 
provides an additional reason for condemning the use of magnitude inquiries 
at the prima facie stage. 
B. The Statistical Standard of Job-Related Business Necessity 
Statistics are also relevant to the second stage of disparate impact litigation, 
in which a defendant must prove the job-relatedness and business necessity of 
a policy that has been shown to have a prima facie disparate impact. Compared 
to the plaintiff ’s prima facie standard, the defendant’s proof of job-related 
business necessity is typically described as a more stringent standard. Prima fa-
cie disparate impact requires a plaintiff to “only show” that a policy causes a 
 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012) (providing for compensatory and punitive damages in cases 
of intentional discrimination); id. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (describing the remedies that are availa-
ble for disparate impact claims); see also Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 579, 600 (2001) (contrasting intentional discrimination and disparate impact claims 
and noting that the latter “are limited to equitable relief”); Meghan E. Changelo, Reconciling 
Class Action Certiﬁcation with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 133, 
138 (2003) (“[P]laintiffs are not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages when they 
succeed in showing disparate impact discrimination.”). 
89. See, e.g., William M. Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507 
(1968); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 
42 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1995). 
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“discriminatory pattern,” while job-related business necessity requires proof 
that the policy has “a manifest relationship to the employment in question.”
90
  
This distinction supports the aims of disparate impact. The prima facie 
stage only identiﬁes a disparity-causing policy. The second stage offers the em-
ployer the opportunity to prove that the discriminatory policy falls within the 
subset of policies that Title VII is willing to tolerate on the basis of business ne-
cessity. As such, the second stage requires a more robust consideration of the 
policy’s signiﬁcance to business interests; a mere relation is not necessarily 
sufficient to permit discrimination. 
At the second stage, the defendant must show that the contested policy is 
“job related” and “consistent with business necessity.”
91
 The EEOC’s Uniform 
Guidelines indicate three measures of validation in assessing this demonstra-
tion of job-related business necessity: criterion-related, content, and construct 
validation. Criterion-related validation requires empirical data showing that 
the selection procedure “is predictive of or signiﬁcantly correlated with im-
portant elements of job performance.”
92
 Content validation requires “data 
showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative of im-
portant aspects of performance on the job.”
93
 Construct validation requires data 
showing that the selection “procedure measures the degree to which candidates 
have identiﬁable characteristics which have been determined to be important in 
successful performance in the job.”
94
 
Many courts require showing both statistical and practical signiﬁcance in 
defending a discriminatory test.
95
 To assess these showings, courts often look 
to the correlation coefficient, a numeral measure from -1 to 1 of the relation be-
 
90. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (“[T]o establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in question 
select applicants for hire in a discriminatory pattern. Once it is shown that the employment 
standards are discriminatory in effect, the employer must meet ‘the burden of showing that 
any given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the employment in question.’” 
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971))). 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (2016); see also Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that a test had been properly validated based on a sufficient correlation between 
test scores and job performance); 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (discussing the minimum standards 
for validity studies). 
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5; see also id. § 1607.14 (discussing the minimum standards for validity 
studies). 
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5; see also id. § 1607.14 (discussing the minimum standards for validity 
studies). 
95. See, e.g., Hamer, 872 F.2d at 1525-26; Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 871 F. Supp. 
305, 313 n.25 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
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tween two values, between the test and job performance.
96
 But many do not 
look speciﬁcally at the practical signiﬁcance of the (statistically signiﬁcant) cor-
relations presented as evidence of validation. Although defendants often have 
to show a moderate correlation between a policy (e.g., a test) and the outcome 
(e.g., job performance), this is often not interpreted through the lens of a 
magnitude inquiry, asking how big the actual relationship is. 
The use of correlation coefficients ought to be accompanied by a practical 
signiﬁcance analysis of the policy or procedure’s job-relatedness and business 
necessity. Speciﬁcally, it ought to be accompanied by consideration of both the 
relevance of the evidence to a real-world job-related business necessity and the 
magnitude of this relation. A test that is merely correlated with job perfor-
mance might not actually be related to the job or a “business necessity.” For in-
stance, achieving a certain score on a general standardized achievement test 
might be correlated with some aspect of job performance, even though that 
achievement is not actually a strong predictor of job success. 
Taking practical signiﬁcance into account means rejecting implausible 
claims of job-relatedness in which there is no strong relation between the poli-
cy and outcome. For instance, in Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., a statistically sig-
niﬁcant correlation between a policy and job performance of 0.3 was rejected 
since it was found to have little practical signiﬁcance—indicating only nine per-
cent of job success attributable to the disparity-causing policy.
97
 
In other cases, paltry consideration of practical signiﬁcance permits evi-
dence of job-relatedness that has little practical signiﬁcance. Consider United 
States v. City of Garland.
98
 There, the court determined that police and ﬁreﬁght-
er job examinations were job related on the basis of a signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween those exams and performance on academy exams and state certiﬁcation 
exams. Yet an important practical signiﬁcance question was obscured: what 
magnitude of signiﬁcance do these exams have to the job? The practical signiﬁ-
 
96. See, e.g., EEOC v. Atlas Paper Box Co., 868 F.2d 1487 (6th Cir. 1989); Ensley Branch of the 
NAACP v. Seibels, 13 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 11,504 (N.D. Ala. 1977). 
97. See Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Regarding the validity 
coefficients in the case, the court noted, “[A] low coefficient, even though statistically sig-
niﬁcant, may indicate a low practical utility.” Id. at 1348. The court further stated: “[O]ne 
can readily see that even on the statistically signiﬁcant correlations of .30 or so, only 9% of 
the success on the job is attributable to success on the [test] batteries. This is a very low lev-
el, which does not justify use of these batteries, where correlations are all below .30. In con-
clusion, based upon the guidelines and statistical analysis . . . the Court cannot ﬁnd that 
these tests have any real practical utility. The guidelines do not permit a ﬁnding of job-
relatedness where statistical but not practical signiﬁcance is shown. On this ﬁnal ground as 
well, therefore, the test batteries must be rejected.” Id. at 1351. 
98. No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV-0307-L, 2004 WL 741295 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2004). 
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cance of an exam’s results for job-relatedness and consistency with business ne-
cessity cannot be inferred simply from a correlation between the exam and an-
other exam. Moreover, there is little rigorous consideration of the magnitude of 
this effect; even if the evidence supports a good inference for the job-relation, 
does it support evidence of a sufficiently large effect consistent with business 
necessity? 
This particular decision is even more problematic. In the same decision, the 
court determined that there was insufficient practical signiﬁcance to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact,
99
 and there would be sufficient proof of 
job-relatedness consistent with business necessity, without serious considera-
tion of the practical signiﬁcance of this evidence.
100
 This provides an example 
of a bizarre practice: a relatively high practical signiﬁcance requirement in the 
prima facie stage of disparate impact, but a paltry one in the job-relatedness 
business necessity stage. 
 
99. Id. at *23 (“Dr. Stoikov analyzed the practical signiﬁcance or the magnitude of the effect of 
rank-order hiring. She found that the percentage[s] of minority and white test-passers who 
were hired are not signiﬁcantly different, and thus concluded that ranking could not have 
adversely affected the chances of being hired. Dr. Stoikov also analyzed the hiring conse-
quences of the City’s use of [test scores]. She concluded that in the Police Department, there 
was no signiﬁcant shortfall in expected Hispanic hires, and one additional black hire would 
have eliminated the signiﬁcant shortfall in expected black hires. She further concluded that 
in the Fire Department from 1992 through 1998, there was no signiﬁcant shortfall in ex-
pected Hispanic hires, and a signiﬁcant shortfall of 1.2 black hires.”). The Note does not aim 
to challenge all the details of the court’s analysis or even its holding. The main purpose of 
the example is to show the rigor with which some courts analyze prima facie disparate im-
pact. The plaintiff should be required to show nothing more than a disparity. 
100. Id. at *23 n.74 (“Even if the United States has established a prima facie showing, which it 
has not, the City presented sufficient evidence to establish a business necessity and job relat-
edness for its practice of ‘rank order hiring.’ Speciﬁcally, Dr. Wollack testiﬁed that rank-
order hiring based on [test] scores is psychometrically appropriate because there was an ad-
equate job analysis, the examinations were reliable, and there was a useful spread of scores. 
Dr. Wollack further testiﬁed that rank-order hiring is appropriate because the relationship 
between test scores and job performance is assumed to be linear. The court incorporates by 
reference its discussion of Dr. Wollack’s testimony regarding the validity of the . . . examina-
tions.”). This is dicta (since the court holds that the prima facie demonstration fails), but it 
reveals a serious lack of engagement with the practical signiﬁcance of an employer’s rebuttal. 
While the plaintiff ’s prima facie case is scrutinized for its practical signiﬁcance, this hypo-
thetical determination of job-related business necessity does not nearly as robustly address 
practical signiﬁcance—in either the magnitude or conﬁdence aspects. 
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C. The Statistical Standard of Showing a Suitable Alternative 
At the third stage, courts use statistics to evaluate the plaintiff ’s demonstra-
tion of a nondiscriminatory alternative policy.
101
 This stage provides a ﬁnal op-
portunity for the plaintiff to rebut the defendant’s job-related business necessi-
ty defense by offering an alternative policy that could serve the business’s 
legitimate interests without the same discriminatory impact. Comparatively 
few disparate impact cases proceed to this third stage, but the cases that do 
consider alternative proposals may look to statistics to evaluate the merits of 
the alternative proposal. Courts may conduct practical signiﬁcance inquiries 
following the logic of the Stage 1 inquiry, asking whether the evidence indicates 
that the alternative proposal will have large practical signiﬁcance, greatly or 
sufficiently reducing discriminatory impact. Such an inquiry is a magnitude in-
quiry, assessing the sufficiency of the effect size. As in the other stages, there is 
also room at the third stage for a conﬁdence inquiry, asking whether the court 
is conﬁdent that the alternative proposal will reduce discrimination (at any 
rate). 
The argument here follows directly from the logic of Section II.A. Given 
disparate impact’s foundational texts, purposes, and interpretations, practical 
signiﬁcance testing—in the sense of measuring the magnitude of some dispari-
ty reduction—should not be relevant to assessing an alternative policy.
102
 A 
suitable alternative policy should be accepted regardless of whether it decreases 
discriminatory impact by a small or large amount. What matters is that the 
policy can be expected to actually reduce discriminatory impact.
103
 Disparate 
impact aims to remove all unnecessary discriminatory barriers, not just the 
largest ones. The third stage inquiry asks whether the employer “refuses to 
adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate im-
 
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2012). 
102. At least it is not relevant to the most obvious way in which practical signiﬁcance testing 
might enter: evaluating the degree to which discrimination will be reduced. A more radical 
recommendation might be made: practical signiﬁcance testing is relevant for the purpose of 
evaluating the degree to which the alternative policy realizes the legitimate business inter-
ests. I do not pursue a full treatment of this proposal here, but simply offer the suggestion. 
If practical signiﬁcance is relevant in determining the degree of business necessity that justi-
ﬁes discrimination, might it also be relevant in determining the degree to which an alterna-
tive policy falls (slightly or severely) short of serving those interests? 
103. Cf. Jones v. City of Bos., 118 F. Supp. 3d 425 (D. Mass. 2015) (holding the plaintiffs did not 
meet their burden of showing a suitable alternative practice without a similarly undesirable 
racial effect that served the city’s legitimate interest), rev’d in part, 845 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(holding the plaintiffs did demonstrate a suitable alternative practice). 
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pact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.”
104
 The employment practice 
need not have dramatically, substantially, or even signiﬁcantly less disparate 
impact—just “less.” 
Because comparatively fewer cases proceed to this stage of disparate impact 
analysis, this Section ﬁrst considers a stylized example, an imagined case in 
which this issue of practical signiﬁcance is clearly implicated at the third stage 
of disparate impact analysis. Imagine, as an example, that a disparate impact 
case has proceeded to the third stage. The contested policy results in a twenty-
percentage-point racial difference between black and white test takers, but the 
alternative policy would still result in a ﬁfteen-percentage-point differential. 
Given some courts’ treatment of practical signiﬁcance at the prima facie stage, 
one could imagine courts deciding that a ﬁve-percentage-point reduction does 
not support a suitable alternative policy because it is not “practically signiﬁ-
cant.” 
The fundamental aim of disparate impact is the removal of unnecessary and 
discriminatory barriers so as to make factors like race irrelevant in employment 
practices. This means that assessment of an alternative practice’s magnitude of 
disparity reduction is dubious. Does the fact that some alternative practice 
would be only modestly less discriminatory justify rejecting it? The broader 
disparate impact framework clearly recommends any policy that offers even 
modest discrimination reduction. While conﬁdence inquiries are relevant—at 
this stage and all the others—magnitude inquiries are not appropriate in 
weighing an alternative policy. 
i i i . recommendations and implications 
How should courts resolve these questions of disparate statistics? This Part 
proposes three solutions. The most theoretically justiﬁable solution is to strike 
magnitude inquiries from the ﬁrst stage’s prima facie demonstration and the 
third stage’s evaluation of a suitable alternative, but to adopt a more robust 
analysis at the second stage when the defendant presents a job-relatedness and 
business-necessity rebuttal. 
 
104. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) 
(2012)); see also Jones, 845 F.3d 28 (“Application of this prong in this case turns on the an-
swers to three questions: First, does the record contain evidence that would allow a jury to 
ﬁnd that there was an ‘alternative’ method of meeting the Department’s legitimate needs? 
Second, does the record also allow a jury to ﬁnd that adopting that alternative method 
would have had less of a disparate impact? And ﬁnally, could a jury ﬁnd that the Department 
‘refuses to adopt’ that alternative method?”). 
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Before turning to these recommendations, it is worth summarizing the 
framework that has been established and the broad conclusions. First, recall the 
distinctions between magnitude inquiries—those asking whether some dispari-
ty, business interest, or impact reduction is big enough—and conﬁdence in-
quiries—those asking whether how strong an inference can be drawn from sta-
tistical evidence to the real world. 
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figure 1.  
summary of practical significance inquiries at each stage of 
disparate impact analysis 
 
 Magnitude Inquiry Confidence Inquiry  
Stage 1 
Is the prima facie disparity  
sufficiently large? 
 
Ex. “[E]mployment examina-
tions having a 7.1 percentage 
point differential between black 
and white test takers do not, as a 
matter of law, state a prima facie 
case of disparate impact.”  
 
 
[Inappropriate] 
Is there sufficient evidence for 
the existence of a prima facie 
disparity? 
 
Ex. “To determine the practical 
signiﬁcance of statistical results, 
a court must look at the theories 
and assumptions underlying the 
analysis . . . .”
105
 
 
 
 
[Appropriate] 
Stage 2 
Is the policy’s job-relatedness 
and business necessity  
sufficiently large? 
 
Ex. “[O]nly 9% of the success on 
the job is attributable to success 
on the [test] batteries . . . . [T]he 
Court cannot ﬁnd that these tests 
have any real practical utility. 
The guidelines do not permit a 
ﬁnding of job-relatedness where  
statistical but not practical sig-
niﬁcance is shown.”
106
 
 
[Appropriate] 
Is there sufficient evidence for 
the existence of a job-related 
business necessity? 
 
Ex. “[T]he employer must es-
tablish two elements of correla-
tion: . . . the degree to which test 
scores relate to job  
performance . . . [and] the con-
ﬁdence that can be placed on the 
practical signiﬁcance . . . .”
107
 
 
 
[Appropriate] 
 
105. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
106. Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1304, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
107. Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 871 F. Supp. 305, 313 n.25 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing 
Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (11th
 
Cir. 1989)). 
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 Magnitude Inquiry Confidence Inquiry  
Stage 3 
Is the suitable alternative’s 
disparity mitigation  
sufficiently large? 
 
Ex. The contested policy results 
in a twenty-percentage-point ra-
cial difference between black and 
white test takers, but the alterna-
tive policy would still result in a 
ﬁfteen-percentage-point differen-
tial; as a matter of law, a ﬁve-
percentage-point reduction does 
not support a suitable alternative 
policy.
108
 
 
[Inappropriate] 
Is there sufficient evidence for 
the existence of a suitable  
alternative with (some degree 
of) lesser disparate impact? 
 
Ex. In evaluating statistical re-
sults, a court must look at the 
theories and assumptions under-
lying the analysis; this includes 
weighing conﬁdence placed in 
statistical results supporting that 
a policy has reduced discrimina-
tory impact. 
 
[Appropriate] 
 
 
This ﬁgure highlights that courts that conduct magnitude inquiries at Stage 
1 but not Stage 2 are not only conducting investigations at odds with the text 
and interpretation of disparate impact, as I have argued, but are also conduct-
ing unjustiﬁably asymmetric inquiries. 
The primary recommendation is that courts should reject a magnitude in-
quiry for the demonstrations of a prima facie disparate impact and a suitable 
alternative stages of analysis, but insist on a more robust inquiry during the de-
fendant’s job-related business necessity rebuttal. This solution is the most 
faithful to the text, purpose, and precedent of disparate impact law. Requiring 
a showing of prima facie disparate impact of a particular size is out of line with 
the original interpretations of Title VII,
109
 as well as with more recent Supreme 
Court precedents.
110
 Equally inappropriate is a thin or absent investigation into 
the practical signiﬁcance of a defendant’s defense that a disparity-causing im-
pact is a job-related business necessity,
111
 requiring proof of a manifest
112
 rela-
 
108. Because comparatively fewer courts have considered Stage 3 of analysis, I use stylized exam-
ples for the magnitude and conﬁdence inquiries in this table. 
109. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
110. E.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
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tionship between the contested policy and a job-related function that is not 
simply justiﬁed by a business interest,
113
 but is a “business necessity.”
114
 
Even if this primary recommendation is not adopted on the basis of Part 
II’s arguments, there are two more modest possibilities that deal with the 
asymmetry of conducting magnitude inquiries at some but not all stages of 
disparate impact analysis. The previous Part justiﬁes a disparity in the use of 
statistics in one direction—magnitude inquiries during the second stage, but 
not during the ﬁrst or third stages—given the aims of disparate impact theory. 
However, an asymmetry in the other direction is entirely lacking in justiﬁca-
tion. 
One option to deal with the asymmetry is to “level down” the magnitude 
inquiry requirement across the stages of disparate impact analysis, for example 
by removing it from the prima facie disparate impact standard. If a court en-
gages in no serious magnitude analysis at the business-necessity-rebuttal stage, 
it should not engage in a rigorous one at the prima facie stage (or third stage). 
The other option is to “level up” the practical signiﬁcance requirement across 
stages of disparate impact litigation, most crucially by raising the level of mag-
nitude inquiry at the business-necessity rebuttal. If a court engages in a robust 
magnitude analysis at the prima facie stage or evaluation of a less-
discriminatory alternative stage, it ought to do the same at the job-related and 
business-necessity-rebuttal stage. 
These two options represent each half of the primary recommendation. 
They are less justiﬁable than the primary recommendation, but they do correct 
the unjustiﬁed asymmetry and they may be more immediately attainable. And 
they would be preferable to current practices that require a magnitude demon-
stration for the plaintiff ’s prima facie demonstration, but not for the defend-
ant’s business-necessity demonstration. 
If adopted, any of these recommendations will likely affect both disparate 
impact litigation and business practices out-of-court. First, the recommenda-
tions may result in different decisions in disparate impact cases. The Jones
115
 
decision is recent, but already there are suggestions that removal of a prima fa-
cie stage magnitude inquiry will result in different outcomes for disparate im-
pact cases. For instance, Smith v. City of Boston held that a police department’s 
lieutenant-selection process had a racially disparate impact and was not a job-
 
112. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31. 
113. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
115. Jones v. City of Bos., 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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related business necessity that survived disparate impact analysis.
116
 Like many 
analyses of disparate impact, the discussion of the prima facie stage involved 
much consideration of statistics. The court frequently cited to Jones in requiring 
that the impact not be the result of chance,
117
 declining to require a strict statis-
tical signiﬁcance cutoff,
118
 and rejecting the necessity of the four-ﬁfths rule, in-
terpreted as a practical signiﬁcance requirement.
119
 Removing such magnitude 
requirements from the prima facie stage will allow a broader range of legiti-
mate disparate impact claims to go forward. Just because a policy has a “small” 
discriminatory impact does not mean the interests of those people are less de-
serving of protection. 
Requiring a more robust analysis of the magnitude and conﬁdence aspects 
of practical signiﬁcance at the business necessity stage would also affect dispar-
ate impact litigation. Cases like United States v. City of Garland
120
 would require 
a more rigorous analysis. Discriminatory policies justiﬁed on the basis of busi-
ness necessity would be held to a more robust inquiry into the degree to which 
the business necessity affects the legitimate interest. 
Similarly, prohibiting magnitude inquiries at the third stage would allow 
disparate impact to better realize its aims. The third stage targets any real re-
duction in discrimination. Together these recommendations remedy inappro-
priate uses of statistics in disparate impact litigation and provide opportunity 
for greater plaintiff success in legitimate employment discrimination suits. 
Second, the recommendations would also have out-of-court effects. The 
recommendations might seem likely to increase disparate impact litigation. Re-
gardless of whether that would actually occur,
121
 removing barriers to success-
ful disparate impact claims should incentivize employers to reﬂect more 
thoughtfully on their employment practices. Disparate impact litigation is just 
one mechanism to achieve the aims of greater employment equality. Another 
mechanism—in many ways a preferable one—is for employers to simply re-
move disparity-causing policies and procedures that are not business necessi-
ties or replace necessary policies with less discriminatory ones. Whether or not 
disparate impact litigation increases, it is plausible that there is power in the 
mere threat of litigation; any real disparity—no matter how small—caused by 
 
116. Smith v. City of Bos., 144 F. Supp. 3d 177 (D. Mass. 2015). 
117. Id. at 191. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 192. 
120. No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV-0307-L, 2004 WL 741295 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2004). 
121. Cf. supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (arguing that the Note’s recommendations are 
unlikely to encourage frivolous disparate impact claims). 
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an employment practice could be the target of disparate impact litigation. It 
may be difficult to quantify the number of discriminatory employment practic-
es that the employer might remove to comply with disparate impact law or to 
minimize the threat of litigation. But that effect is equally important. 
These arguments are not partisan; they do not unfairly help plaintiffs bring 
disparate impact claims, whether meritorious or not. In fact, the recommenda-
tions might result in reduced litigation—for example, if employers respond to 
the threat of litigation by removing unnecessary and discriminatory employ-
ment barriers. Rather, these arguments seek to correct the use of statistics to 
achieve the proper understanding of both disparate impact’s antisubordination 
aim and its business necessity limit. Whether the acceptance of such recom-
mendations would help plaintiffs, defendants, employees, or employers de-
pends on empirical questions about the parties’ responsive behaviors. The re-
moval of discriminatory employment practices, subject to the limit of business 
necessity, whether through litigation or other incentives, is at the heart of dis-
parate impact law. Remedying disparate and inappropriate uses of statistics 
moves the law closer to this fundamental aim. 
Consider again the very project of paying attention to such “small” dispari-
ties. It might seem unimportant to focus on ameliorating employment practices 
where the local discriminatory impact reduction is relatively small, such as re-
ducing a discriminatory impact by just ﬁve percent. But such reasoning belies 
the theory of disparate impact: no discriminatory effect is too small to matter. 
But even one unconvinced by disparate impact theory and compelled by a sin-
gular focus on big effects must address a second practical consideration. Small 
discriminatory effects at multiple points—in an individual’s life or across a 
group—result in large cumulative disadvantages.
122
 This Note’s recommenda-
tions suggest broad changes in the way courts treat numerous small disparities. 
It may be the case that the current social landscape does not consist primarily 
of policies that cause infrequent and large disparities but rather, an enormous 
web of smaller-disparity-causing policies, the combination of which results in 
large disparities overall. If so, the total effect of attending more judiciously to 
“small” disparities may not be so small. 
 
122. See MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 69 (Rebecca Blank et al. eds., 2004) (“[E]ffects of 
discrimination may cumulate over time through the course of an individual’s life . . . .”); An-
thony G. Greenwald et al., Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit Association Test Can Have 
Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 553 (2015); cf. Robert P. Abelson, 
A Variance Explanation Paradox: When a Little Is a Lot, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 129 (1985) (ex-
plaining how, although skill strongly predicts baseball batting success, the correlation be-
tween skill and getting a hit at any given at-bat is low). 
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conclusion 
Statistics, particularly “practical signiﬁcance,” play a crucial role in disparate 
impact analysis. This Note distinguishes between two types of practical signiﬁ-
cance inquiries: magnitude inquiries—questions about the magnitude of a 
ﬁnding supported by statistical evidence—and conﬁdence inquiries—questions 
about the strength of statistical evidence. Looking across the three stages of 
disparate impact analysis, I argue for the inappropriateness of magnitude in-
quiries at the ﬁrst prima facie stage of demonstrating disparate impact and at 
the third stage of providing a less discriminatory alternative, but that such a 
robust inquiry should come at the second stage of a defendant’s job-related 
business necessity rebuttal. 
This buttresses recent court decisions to not require demonstration of a 
particular magnitude of disparity at the prima facie stage. It also outlines a ho-
listic conception of practical signiﬁcance testing across every area of disparate 
impact analysis, a project bearing on the current circuit split and also the doc-
trine’s future challenges. 
The consequences of these conclusions should not be underestimated. A 
universal rejection of magnitude inquiry at the prima facie stage of disparate 
impact would have a large effect. Cases like Moore v. Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co.
123
 and Frazier v. Garrison
124
 would require different justiﬁcations. Requir-
ing a more robust analysis at the defendant’s rebuttal stage would be equally 
impactful, requiring more thoroughgoing analysis in cases like United States v. 
City of Garland.
125
 
These changes are justiﬁed. Requiring that a prima facie disparate impact 
be of a certain magnitude invites inappropriate subjective weighing, asking 
judges to assess whether a disparity is big enough. Failing to inquire robustly 
about the practical signiﬁcance of a defendant’s rebuttal is equally problemat-
ic—resulting in the justiﬁcation of policies that have a discriminatory impact on 
the basis of slack correlations. So too is requiring that an alternative proposal 
be sufficiently less discriminatory, rather than simply less discriminatory. 
All of these practices are at odds with the motivation and aims of disparate 
impact: a prima facie disparate impact must simply demonstrate a disparity 
caused by the contested policy on a protected class; a job-related business ne-
cessity defense is meant to show the weighty signiﬁcance of the contested poli-
cy, which must bear a manifest relationship to the employment, justifying the 
 
123. 593 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979). 
124. 980 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1993). 
125. No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV-0307-L, 2004 WL 741295 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2004). 
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permission of a discriminatory policy; and an alternative proposal is meant to 
provide a policy that serves the legitimate business interests, with a large or 
even small degree of lesser discriminatory impact. 
The Note recommends analyzing and correcting these uses of practical sig-
niﬁcance testing across the three stages of disparate impact analysis. The rec-
ommendations advance disparate impact’s fundamental aim: removing artiﬁ-
cial and arbitrary barriers that operate to discriminate on the basis of a 
protected classiﬁcation. 
 
